内容摘要：文章以2007—2011年我国A股上市公司为样本，探讨了高管将其私人控制权收益在同行业内做比较时所产生的公平性感受对公司价值的影响，揭示了高管公平性偏好的作用机理。研究发现：（1）相对于股权分散或者存在股权制衡的公司，股权集中公司高管控制权收益绝对额及控制权收益一公司价值敏感性较高，而额外控制权收益的分布情况却与之大相径庭。国有控股公司的高管控制权收益绝对额均值最大，但额外控制权收益均值较小；而家族控股公司的高管控制权收益绝对额均值最小，但额外控制权收益均值较大。（2）控制权收益绝对额与额外控制权收益的激励方向相反。相对于股权分散或者存在股权制衡的公司，股权集中公司高管控制权收益绝对额显著降低公司价值，而正向额外控制权收益显著提升公司价值，负向额外控制权收益则显著降低公司价值。
关键词：公平性偏好;私人控制权收益;公司价值;行业基准
作者简介：[1]广东财经大学会计学院,广东广州510320
Executive Fairness Preference, Private Benefits of Control and Firm Value：Evidence from Industry Benchmark of A-share Listed Companies
基 金：基金项目：国家自然科学基金重点项目（71032006）;国家社会科学基金青年项目（12CGI.034、13CGI.053）;教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目（13YJC630205）;广东省哲学社会科学“十二五”规划学科共建项目（GD12XGL12）;广东省哲学社会科学“十一五”规划项目（GD10CGL01）
摘 要：文章以2007—2011年我国A股上市公司为样本，探讨了高管将其私人控制权收益在同行业内做比较时所产生的公平性感受对公司价值的影响，揭示了高管公平性偏好的作用机理。研究发现：（1）相对于股权分散或者存在股权制衡的公司，股权集中公司高管控制权收益绝对额及控制权收益一公司价值敏感性较高，而额外控制权收益的分布情况却与之大相径庭。国有控股公司的高管控制权收益绝对额均值最大，但额外控制权收益均值较小；而家族控股公司的高管控制权收益绝对额均值最小，但额外控制权收益均值较大。（2）控制权收益绝对额与额外控制权收益的激励方向相反。相对于股权分散或者存在股权制衡的公司，股权集中公司高管控制权收益绝对额显著降低公司价值，而正向额外控制权收益显著提升公司价值，负向额外控制权收益则显著降低公司价值。
Based on a sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2011, this pa- per examines the impact of fairness feelings concerning an industry comparison of private benefits of control on firm value and reveals the function mechanism of executive fairness preference. It comes to the following conclusions： firstly, compared to companies with dispersed ownership or outside block-holders, the absolute amount of private benefits of control and the sensitivity of private benefits of control to firm value are higher in companies with concentrated owner- ship, but the distribution of additional private benefits of control differs widely; the mean of the absolute amount of private benefits of control in state-owned companies is the largest, but the mean of additional private benefits of control is smaller; the mean of the absolute a- mount of private benefits of control in family-controlled companies is the smallest, but the mean of additional private benefits of control is larger; secondly, the incentive direction of the absolute amount of private benefits of control is the opposite of the one of additional pri- vate benefits of control; compared to companies with dispersed ownership or outside block- holders, the absolute amount of private benefits of control significantly reduces firm value, and positive or negative additional private benefits of control can significantly increase or re- duce firm value respectively in companies with concentrated ownership.
关 键 词：公平性偏好 私人控制权收益 公司价值 行业基准
fairness preference private benefit of control firm value industry benchmark
分 类 号：F275
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